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The New Nuclear Power Generation
Licensing Scheme in Its Defining Moment:
A Regulatory Vessel Equipped to Support a
Thriving Industry or Drifting Towards Stormy
Waters Capable of Running the Nuclear
Revival Aground?
Anna Knecht*

Abstract

This Student Note assesses Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s “new” nuclear licensing scheme by way of
comparison with the old, two-step process under which the industry
endured an era of dormancy lasting nearly forty years. With a focus
on the novel ITAAC review process, this Note argues that while the
Part 52 process is superior to its predecessor, certain significant
issues (articulated herein) must be resolved before the new
regulatory framework can support the economic, environmental,
safety, and other advantages it aims to achieve.
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I. Introduction
Now, I know it has been assumed that those who champion
the environment are opposed to nuclear power. But the fact
is, even though we have not broken ground on a new
nuclear power plant in [decades], nuclear energy remains
our largest source of fuel that produces no carbon
emissions. To meet our growing energy needs and prevent
the worst consequences of climate change, we’ll need to
increase our supply of nuclear power. It’s that simple.1
These words of our current President, hailing from the political party
historically opposed to nuclear power, are suggestive of a sea of change.
Despite strong currents of opposition to nuclear power in the United States,2
1.
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Admin. Announces
Loan Guarantees to Construct New Nuclear Power Reactors in Ga. (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/obama-administration-announces-loanguarantees-construct-new-nuclear-power-reactors (last visited April 16, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also
Interview by Jonathan Fahey with Christine Todd Whitman, Former EPA Adm’r and N.J.
Governor (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/13/christine-todd-whitmanbusiness-energy-whitman.html (“Unless we embrace . . . nuclear it’s going to be very hard to
see how we get to a place where we have [twenty-four/seven] reliable, affordable power that
doesn’t degrade the environment.”).
2.
See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Info. Res. Serv., Safe, Clean Energy Advocates
Reject Obama’s Call for More Nuclear Power (Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.nirs.org/press/0130-2010/2 (last visited April 16, 2012) (“President Obama must rethink his priorities, and
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it seems we are in the midst of a “nuclear renaissance”3 in the industry,
after several decades of dormancy.4 In the recent midterm State of the
Union address, the President highlighted his proposed energy plan, which
included nuclear power at the fore, further suggestive of the political
popularity of facilitating development of the industry.5
Many factors are propelling this renaissance. Consider the
following: increases in fuel prices,6 heightened concerns over global
warming,7 the Deepwater Horizon disaster,8 unrest in nations that are a
source of natural gas,9 significant developments in nuclear technology,10
daunting rates of unemployment,11 rising political support of nuclear
quickly . . . . Nuclear is not a climate solution; indeed, it would make the problem worse by
diverting tens of billions of dollars that could be spent on safe, clean, cost-effective energy
sources.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
3.
See, e.g., Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current “Nuclear Renaissance” in the United
States, Its Underlying Reasons, and its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279, 287 (2008)
(arguing that the oft-used catch phrase “nuclear renaissance” is in fact a reality in the United
States).
4.
See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Firm Applies to Expand Nuclear Plant in Maryland,
WASH. POST (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/30/AR2007073001881_pf.html (quoting NRC spokesman who
noted that Constellation Energy Group’s submission was “the first application to operate and
build a new reactor that the NRC has received in about 30 years”).
5.
See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, ¶ 32 (Jan. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133224933/transcript-obamas-state-of-unionaddress (setting forth his proposal for an energy plan, noting the necessity of nuclear power
generation within that plan).
6.
See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Can the Oil Shock Alone Explain the Financial Crisis,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/print/2009/04/
can-the-oil-shock-alone-explain-the-financial-crisis/16459/ (noting that an oil shock could
possibly have been “a significant catalyzer for the push toward energy reform”).
7.
See, e.g., Michael Totty, Nuclear’s Fall—and Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at
R6 (noting the relationship between global warming and the increased attention on nuclear
power).
8.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Obama: Oil Spill Shows Need for Alternative Fuels,
ST.
J.
BLOG
(May
26,
2010,
4:23
PM),
WALL
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/26/obama-oil-spill-shows-need-for-alternative-fuels/
(“[T]he spill in the Gulf, which is just heartbreaking, only underscores the necessity of
seeking alternative fuel sources.”).
9.
See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Oil Flows, But High Prices Jangle Nerves, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2011, at A12 (noting that unrest in the Middle East has motivated the world to move
toward alternative energy sources and to examine nuclear power specifically).
10.
See, e.g., Nuclear’s Next Generation, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/15048703/ (describing six new designs for nuclear power
reactors that are alleged to provide advances in safety and efficiency and noting how prior to
these developments little progress had been made regarding the technology underpinning the
civilian nuclear power generation since the 1950s).
11.
See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The New Jobs in Atomic Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/business/energy-environment/22TECH.html
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power,12 and projected increases in energy demand13—these are just some
of the forces which together suggest the development of a new fleet of
nuclear plants in the United States not only makes sense, but is inevitable.
Our most recent presidential campaign, in which candidates from both
parties supported nuclear power within their respective energy plans,14
indicates that the American public is on board. The successful development
of a new fleet of safe, operational plants would be a titanic achievement
with far-reaching implications.
In isolation, the factors noted may suggest that end is inevitable;
however, various forces are capable of thwarting the course. Finding a
workable plan to deal with spent fuel, wading through the fallout of the
global financial crisis, avoiding a catastrophe related to nuclear
proliferation, and, critically, reviving and maintaining a viable regulatory
scheme are just a few of the challenges that must be met if this nuclear
renaissance is to thrive.15 What follows is an analysis of one key
component: the regulatory scheme, specifically, the licensing of new
nuclear plants. The current wave of plant development is taking place under
a new licensing scheme promulgated by Congress and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), a process that is largely untested to
date.16 A navigable, legally permissible licensing framework is a
prerequisite for this fleet if it is to avoid the fate of the last tranche of
nuclear reactors whereby some plants met their demise even before going
on-line,17 part of a series of events that precipitated an era of dormancy in
the nuclear industry that lasted upwards of forty years.
(noting the job creation that will be a consequence of both constructing and operating a new
nuclear facility).
12.
See infra, Part II.C.2 (specifying some of the federal legislation enacted to support
development of the nuclear industry).
13.
See Annual Energy Outlook 2010, Electricity Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(May 11, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo10/electricity.html (last visited April
16, 2012) (projecting that total electricity demand will increase thirty percent by 2035) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
14.
See, e.g., David Jackson, McCain, Obama Promote Nuclear Energy Plans, U.S.A.
TODAY (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-08-05mccain-nuclear_N.htm (noting Democratic and Republican presidential candidates’ support
of nuclear power in an energy plan, albeit to varying degrees).
15.
See Frye, supra note 3, at 287 (setting forth a comprehensive discussion of nine
factors which could lead to the derailment of the renaissance).
16.
See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited April 16, 2012)
(indicating that no COL has been issued to date, thus no construction has begun and no
ITAAC have expired according to Part 52) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Note that “construction” is a term of art. See 10
C.F.R. § 50.2 (2010) (defining construction); see also, infra notes 101–02 and
accompanying text (discussing the limited work authorization that allows initial excavation
and other site work up to the point of laying the foundation).
17.
See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, NRC Staff Terminates
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This Note argues that this new regulatory scheme, while superior to
the old licensing process, must resolve significant licensing issues if it is to
provide the basis for the thriving nuclear industry that many hope will
support America’s growing power needs. Part II describes the new
licensing process affecting the current generation of nuclear plants by way
of contrast with the old two-step licensing scheme, with an emphasis on the
novel pre-operational Inspections, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
(“ITAAC”)18 review process. Part III describes how, despite the current
ITAAC review process’s efficiency advantages, in present form, the
process falls short in two ways: (1) by failure to provide legally sufficient
opportunity for public participation and (2) by effective reversion to the
two-step process that has proven antithetical to successful development in
the nuclear power industry. Part IV describes how operational
modifications by industry members and the NRC, along with mechanisms
to provide for administrative flexibility, may provide the regulatory
foundation that allows the new licensing process to support a thriving
nuclear energy program. Finally, Part V concludes that the new licensing
scheme has the potential to provide the regulatory framework for this new
fleet of reactors to attain enormous energy, environmental, safety, and
economic advantages—but not without significant additional yet feasible
steps taken by industry and the regulators.
II. The New Nuclear Licensing Process
A thorough understanding of the new licensing process that
governs this generation of nuclear plants requires a solid grasp of the
context in which it is currently operating and the underlying historical

Shoreham License; Authorizes Release of Site (Apr. 12, 1995) (describing the history of the
Shoreham facility that was shut down in 1987 two years after receiving its operating license,
having never gone into operation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment); Robert T. Grieves et al., A $1.6 Billion Nuclear Fiasco,
MAG.
(Oct.
31,
1983),
TIME
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921377,00.html
(describing
the
financial, managerial, construction, and other problems at Cincinnati Gas & Electric’s
Zimmer plant that led to the plant’s cancellation after spending billions of dollars). While the
Shoreham facility was shut down and never utilized, the Zimmer facility later converted to
coal-fired generation.
18.
See infra Part III (explaining the ITAAC review process at length). Implicit in any
reference to ITAAC is the following definition: The specific inspections, tests, and analyses
regarding a single component that the holder of a combined license shall perform, and
acceptance criteria that “are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if
the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility
has been constructed and will be operated in conformity” with the combined license, the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC’s rules and regulations. 10 C.F.R.
§ 52.17(b)(3) (2011).
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developments that led to the regulatory scheme as it exists today.19 This
essential building block is set forth in subpart A. Next, subpart B highlights
specific defects of the old process that the new one intended to cure. With
this foundation, subpart C describes the technical aspects of the new
licensing scheme and discusses how it is functioning in its nascent stage.
Central to this discussion is a keen focus on the novel ITAAC preoperational review and its desired role within the regulatory scheme as
current nuclear plant development makes headway.
A. Historical Context
The Atomic Energy Act of 195420 set forth government approval
for private access to technical nuclear energy information for the first time,
signaling the beginning of the end of the government monopoly on nuclear
technology, thus paving the way for commercial nuclear power
generation.21 The first fleets of commercial nuclear reactors were licensed
primarily under the Atomic Energy Commission22 regulations,
interchangeably referred to herein as the Part 50 regulations, the old
process, or the two-step process.23
Plants that went into operation under the two-step process were
required to obtain separate construction and operating licenses.24 Given the
19.
For the remainder of this Note, the term “regulatory scheme” will refer specifically
to the new plant licensing regulations. While nuclear regulations in fact encompass a vastly
broader range of activities, in this analysis, the term will pertain to the very focused topic at
issue, the licensing regulations for new nuclear power generation facilities.
20.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2282 (1954) (amending the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 by adding provisions to govern both civilian and military use of
nuclear materials, more specifically, the development and regulation of the use of materials
in American nuclear facilities).
21.
See id. § 2011(b) (“[T]he development, use and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of
living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.”).
22.
The Atomic Energy Commission was the first nuclear regulatory agency in the
United States; its regulatory functions were transferred to the newly-created NRC by the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5814, 5841 (2006) (setting forth the
AEC’s abolition and transfer of power to the new agency). For the purposes of this Note,
“NRC” refers to both regulatory agencies.
23.
See generally 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1976) (setting forth the two-step licensing scheme
regulating development of the first commercial fleet of nuclear reactors). While Part 50
licensing regulations went into effect in 1956, see 21 Fed. Reg. 355–60 (Jan. 19, 1956), and
remain to some extent today, the focus of this section will be on these regulations and their
effect as they applied to vendors seeking licenses starting in the early 1970s, when vendors
increased plant size to the 1100–1250 MWE range.
24.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (providing that a construction permit was a
necessary prerequisite to beginning construction); see also 10 C.F.R. § 50.20(b) (2011)
(providing that an operating license was a necessary prerequisite for operating a nuclear
facility).
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nature of the process of building a nuclear facility, the time that lapsed
between the grant of a construction permit and the grant of an operating
license was significant.25 The example of the North Anna Power Station
proves illustrative: the NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board granted
Virginia Electric Power Company its construction permits for two reactor
units at the North Anna Power Station in February 1971.26 The operating
licenses were not granted until April 1978 and August 1980 for Units 1 and
2 respectively.27 This example is typical in that nearly a decade passed
between these milestones, a time in which countless modifications to the
original construction permit were necessarily made.28 Nearly $4 billion was
exhausted on construction alone (a figure that is dwarfed by the comparable
construction cost figures for the current fleet).29 And receipt of an operating
license after these massive expenditures, capital and otherwise, was far
from certain.
The Part 50 licensing regulations required a company pursuing
development of a nuclear power facility to submit an application to the
NRC for a construction permit.30 The submission did not represent the
beginning of the process for a prospective licensee, given the numerous and
often technical details required in each application;31 rather, it represented
25.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504 (1984)
(noting that nuclear projects were taking ten to twelve years on average).
26.
See Construction Permits CPPR-77 & CPPR-78, Nos. 50-338 & 50-339 (A.E.C.
Feb. 19, 1971) (issuing a construction permit for North Anna Units 1 and 2).
27.
See Facility Operating License, NPF-4, No. 50-338 (N.R.C. Apr. 1, 1978) (issuing
an operating license for North Anna Unit 1); Virginia Electric and Power Company, Facility
Operating License, NPF-7, No. 50-339 (N.R.C. Aug. 21, 1980) (issuing an operating license
for North Anna Unit 2).
28.
See, e.g., Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License, NPF-4, No. 50-338
(N.R.C. Feb. 23, 1979) (issuing the ninth amendment to the facility operating license in less
than one year).
29.
See, e.g. Independent Statistics and Analysis, Virginia Nuclear Profile, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/state_profiles/virginia/va.html
(last visited April 16, 2012) (noting construction costs for North Anna Units 1 and 2) (on file
with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Most projected figures for the
new generation of reactors are exponentially higher than those described in the EIA data for
the first two reactors at North Anna. The projected cost for Vogtle, for example, is $14.5
billion and counting. See Rob Pavey, Vogtle’s Owners Waiting for Approval, AUGUSTA
CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2010), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2010-11-10/vogtlesowners-waiting-approval (noting the estimated project costs as of late 2010).
30.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (“No person may begin the construction of a
production or utilization facility on a site on which the facility is to be operated until that
person has been issued . . . a construction permit under this part . . . .”). Note that
“construction” is a term of art defined by the regulation. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (2010).
31.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.34 (2011) (setting forth the technical requirements that must be
included in every construction permit application submitted to the NRC for review, such as a
preliminary and final safety analysis reports (which include environmental and other
reviews), a physical security plan, and a safeguards contingency plan to name a few).
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the first major instance in which the regulatory agency would provide
official review.32 To reach this stage, an applicant must have participated in
substantial financial planning, business negotiations, safety and
environmental research, and other preliminary activities. Upon the NRC
staff’s decision that the application was sufficient—that is, the applicant
met the regulatory requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 50.34—the staff
would then docket the application and set the schedule for a comprehensive
review.33 A brief look at an application that reached this stage reveals the
significant investment that was necessary to simply “initiate” the licensing
process.34
Upon acceptance for staff review, the agency would schedule,
publicize, and hold a public meeting at the contemplated site to inform the
public of the proposed location and type of plant, along with safety,
environmental, and other relevant aspects of the pending application.35 The
NRC would hold several such meetings while an application was under
review to keep the public appraised of the progress throughout the reactor
licensing process.36 Once the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards37 completed their respective reviews, their findings
were submitted to the Commission by way of letter to the NRC Chairman.38
Prior to the issuance of a construction permit for any commercial
generation facility, the Atomic Energy Act mandates a licensing hearing39
conducted by the NRC’s three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
32.
Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.101(a)(1) (2011) (setting forth the procedural requirements for
submitting applications, and explicitly granting prospective applicants permission to
informally communicate with the NRC prior to filing an application).
33.
See 10 C.F.R. § 2.102 (2011) (setting forth docketing and other processes for
administrative review of an application).
34.
See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Summary of Application, No. 50286 (A.E.C. Feb. 25, 1969) (summarizing the application for a license for Indian Point Unit
3 in eighty-two pages of text, implying that substantial technical and other workup was
involved prior to submitting an application).
35.
See, e.g., Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM’N (July 2005), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/licensing-process-bg.html (describing the initial site meeting held by
the NRC).
36.
See id. (describing the informal public meetings the NRC held to keep the public
apprised of developments regarding potential projects).
37.
See id. (“The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) [is] an
independent group that provides advice on reactor safety to the five-member Commission
[and] reviews each application to construct or operate a nuclear power plant.”).
38.
See id. (noting that the ACRS submits its findings to Chairman of NRC).
39.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“The Commission
shall hold a hearing after thirty days’ notice and publication once in the Federal Register, on
each application under section 2133 . . . of this title for a construction permit for a facility
. . . .”); see also infra, note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory hearing
requirement in the context of the new licensing regulations, whereby this hearing occurs at
the COL stage).
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(“ASLB”).40 This public hearing was held once the staff completed its
review and prepared the Safety and Evaluation Report (detailing the
expected effects of the proposed plant on public health and safety) and the
Final Environmental Impact Statement (having received and addressed
comments to its draft statement from appropriate government agencies and
the public).41 Members of the public were permitted to submit written or
oral statements or to petition for leave to intervene as official parties in the
hearing.42 Beginning in the early 1970s, petitions to intervene and submit
contentions started to flow into the NRC.43
Aspects of the proceeding involving Houston Lighting and Power
Company’s (“HL&P”) pursuit of a construction permit for its Allens Creek
Nuclear Generating Station provide a useful illustration of how, under the
old process, procedural rules were so liberally interpreted so as to deprive
them of their facial meaning with regard to intervening and submitting
contentions in a hearing. HL&P applied for a construction permit in August
1973, and in March 1978 the ASLB initiated the mandatory hearing
proceeding by inviting the filing of petitions to intervene and submission of
contentions.44 In response to a pro se litigant’s petition for leave to
intervene, the ASLB issued an unpublished opinion in March 1980 in which
it rejected the petitioner’s contention, ultimately denying his petition for
leave to intervene.45 Under the old regulations, an outright denial of a
petition was subject to interlocutory appellate review, and the petitioner

40.
See 10 C.F.R. § 2.321 (2011) (granting the Commission authority to establish
ASLBs to conduct administrative hearings regarding granting, suspending, revoking, or
amending licenses).
41.
See, e.g., Consol. Energy Co. of New York Construction Permit Hearing
Transcript, No. 50-247 (A.E.C. Dec. 18, 1970) (referencing the Safety and Evaluation
Report and the Final Environmental Impact Statement).
42.
See 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(a) (2010) (“A person who is not a party . . . may, in the
discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to make a limited appearance by making an
oral or written statement of his or her position on the issues at any session of the hearing or
any prehearing conference . . . .”).
43.
See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing the low procedural
hurdles for intervening in a licensing proceeding, derived not from the regulations
themselves, rather from the interpretation of those regulations). Another significant reason
for this increase in public intervention was the fact that vendors increased output of facilities
by about one-third around this time.
44.
See Donald K. Hill, Regulating the Termination of Proposed Nuclear Power Plant
in Texas: The Allens Creek Experience, 15 ST. MARY’S L. J. 299, 301 n.7 (setting forth the
chronology of events related to Houston Lighting and Power Company’s Allens Creek
project).
45.
See Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 543–44 (1980) (setting forth the facts of the proceeding
before the ASLB which were the subject of the appeal).
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timely filed an appeal.46 In addition to granting the unrepresented petitioner
greater leeway in satisfying the pleading standard in these proceedings,47
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (the “Appeal Board”)
reversed the ASLB’s order denying petitioner’s intervention, thus reviving
his petition.48
In so doing, the Appeal Board looked to uniformly established
precedent49 interpreting the language of the relevant NRC procedural
regulations.50 Despite the fact that the NRC Rules of Practice contain an
explicit demand for supplying a basis for a contention with reasonable
specificity as a prerequisite for intervening, the Appeal Board found that
those rules “have been uniformly interpreted” merely to require a petitioner
to state reasons for a contention,51 with no additional requirement that he
attempt to justify such reasons.52 Through consistent application of this
uniform interpretation, the appeal board effectively wrote out the
procedural requirement set forth in § 2.714 and replaced it with a
significantly more lenient standard, defined by the agency’s case law.
The practical effect of this decision regarding Allens Creek was a
holding that granted leave for petitioner to intervene.53 The appeal board
rejected arguments of both the NRC staff and HL&P, claiming the alleged
basis was “impermissibly vague” and insufficient under the plain language

46.
See 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(b) (1980) (“[A]n order wholly denying a petition for leave
to intervene . . . is appealable by the petitioner on the question of whether the petition
. . . should have been granted in whole or in part.”).
47.
See Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 546 (“[A]lthough
a totally deficient pleading may not be justified on the basis that it was prepared without the
assistance of counsel, a pro se petitioner is not to be held to those standards of clarity and
precision to which a lawyer might reasonably be expected to adhere.”(citation omitted)).
48.
See id. at 551 (reversing and remanding the ASLB decision for further
consideration of the petition for leave on the grounds set forth in the opinion).
49.
See Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-130, 6 A.E.C. 423, 426 (1973) (affirming the ASLB’s grant of a petition to intervene
and interpreting contentions as meeting the requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a)
without requiring a detailed evidence to support the contention). Note that the precedent
cited was issued in 1973, thus this liberal interpretation of the regulation had been applied by
the agency for several years by the time of this Allens Creek decision.
50.
See 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1980) (stating that interested parties may submit a
petition to intervene that shall identify “specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the
proceeding as to which he wishes to intervene and [set] forth with particularity both the facts
pertaining to his interest and the basis for his contentions. . .”) (emphasis added); id.
§ 2.714(b) (requiring a petition set forth the basis for each contention with reasonable
specificity).
51.
Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 549.
52.
See id. at 548 (noting that a reason supporting the contention would suffice and
that providing detailed evidence was not necessary in a petition for leave to intervene).
53.
See id. at 551 (reversing and remanding the ASLB’s decision denying the petition
to intervene with instructions to accept the contention and allow petitioner to intervene).
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of the agency’s own procedural rule;54 instead, it relied solely on
petitioner’s assertion that a marine biomass farm, alleged to be a viable
alternative energy source to a nuclear facility, was not considered in
HL&P’s application.55 The appeal board arrived at this conclusion despite
its expressed doubt that a marine biomass farm was a viable alternative56
and despite petitioner’s reliance on a report that made no such claim.57
Some opponents of nuclear power generation recognized the
agency’s generous granting of petitions to intervene in licensing
proceedings. With that, the floodgates opened: Those opposed to nuclear
power were able to exploit the process as a tactic to anchor the proceeding
from moving forward for significant periods of time.58 Individuals and
organized groups alike were capable of generating a storm within the NRC
hearing process with relative ease.59
To fully comprehend the problematic nature of the bifurcated
process, recognition of the context in which this occurred is critical: Note
the infancy of the overall process at the permit application phase for this
generation of facilities. The issues that tended to surface in these hearings
were merely those of site suitability: geology, seismology, meteorology,
hydrology, and environmental concerns, along with any other possible
impacts of construction and operation.60 The structure of the old licensing
process was such that more often than not, plant design was merely a
concept when construction began (and an even less developed concept
54.
Id. at 545.
55.
See id. (stating the petitioner’s contention exclusively relied on the Project
Independence report).
56.
See id. at 549 (noting that the petitioner should be granted leave to intervene
despite the appeal board’s explicit skepticism regarding the claim’s merit).
57.
See id. at 555 (dissenting opinion) (“The [Project Independence Report] itself does
not offer the marine biomass farm as such an alternative.”).
58.
See, e.g., Ann Carl, The Lloyd Harbor Study Group Intervention—A Response, 28
BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 31, 31 (1972) (describing one groups opposition strategy).
They stated:
[T]he construction of nuclear plants should be held up. We, therefore, made
the decision to oppose all nuclear plants proposed . . . . [In the Shoreham
hearing,] we decided not to limit our intervention to one or two highly specific
and relevant issues . . . but [instead] to bring as much adversary evidence to
the hearing as we could. Facts and opinions would then be sworn and
documented in the record[.]
Id. The hearing transcript in that proceeding turned out to be over thirteen thousand pages
long, and their strategy was employed despite their admission that “winning” in the
construction permit hearing was not possible. Id.
59.
See id. (describing a highly organized group’s strategy to intervene and noting
how their strategy “undoubtedly influenced other interventions”).
60.
See, e.g., Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 545 (“I
contend building and operating a marine biomass farm, or other biomass production systems,
would be environmentally preferable to [Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station] and ask
the Board to deny the permit . . . .”).
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when the application for the construction permit was first submitted to the
agency).61
Given the incipient phase of a particular project, hopeful
intervenors had the ability to submit contentions on these site suitability
issues with ease; however, the opportunity for other effective objections
generally did not present itself at this stage—this was so because the
applicants themselves had not yet fully developed the specifications
regarding design and operation of the facility, leaving little to contest at this
point with regard to significant issues that would eventually require critical
evaluation before the NRC could grant an operating license.62 With this
understanding of the construction permit phase of the old regulatory process
and the context in which it operated, one might sense the storm brewing
while the applicant steered toward step two of the process: obtaining an
operating license.
With a Part 50 construction permit in hand, an applicant had the
green light from the agency to commence construction.63 While companies
advanced toward seeking to obtain an operating license, much transpired—
this phase typically lasted several years and a majority of the components
were actually developed and implemented during this time.64 The broad
outlines set forth in the construction permit application as proposals to meet
the § 50.34 requirements were actualized while construction was ongoing.65
However, nuclear generation facility projects that were initiated in the
1970s met a harsh reality after construction was complete—in 1983, for
example, the plants completed that year cost approximately ten times the
61.
See, e.g., Carl, supra note 58, at 33 (describing one expert’s testimony that “it
would be impossible to predict” if the utility could comply with the agency’s criteria since
“no design had been presented and none of the loads, stresses, or safety margins were
known”). It is important to understand that even the lapse of time between the initial
application and the eventual grant of a construction permit could be substantial. Oftentimes,
the NRC staff determined that the application was insufficient, precipitating a period of
back-and-forth between the prospective applicant and the agency until the staff was satisfied
that the application requirements set forth in § 50.34 were met. Even when the staff accepted
the application for official review, substantial time passed while the agency performed its indepth review; all the while, design specifics took shape.
62.
See, e.g., id. (implying that specific challenges to the design were impossible since
design was not defined at the construction permit stage).
63.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (suggesting that once the permit was obtained,
construction of a facility was permitted). A notable and often-used exception to the
construction permit requirement is the Limited Work Authorization, see infra notes 101–02
and accompanying text (discussing the Limited Work Authorization in the context of the
new licensing process).
64.
Cf. Pierce, supra note 25, at 504 (noting that construction took on average over a
decade and that there was often a “significant disparity between prediction and reality” with
regards to completing a facility).
65.
Cf. id. (noting that completed plants often cost ten times the amount initially
projected, implying that the conceptual design at the outset of a project was developed and
substantially altered while construction was ongoing).
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amount of the initial projections and took an average of ten to twelve years
to finish construction.66
It is this context that the next step under the Part 50 process took
place, whereby licensees had to apply for an operating license as the
construction phase was nearing its end—obtaining such a license was a
regulatory prerequisite to loading fuel to begin operation.67 While a public
hearing was not mandatory as was the case in the construction permit
application phase, the agency did provide an opportunity for one.68
Because a majority of a plant’s components were designed
throughout the construction process, entirely different sets of issues were
the subject of public contentions in the operation license proceedings.69
Consideration for an operating license required the agency’s evaluation of
several issues, for example, safety concerns, conformity with the
construction permit (even though a significant percentage of the reactor
design took place after the construction permit was granted), adequate
management of thousands of contractors and subcontractors, and other
concerns, all of which required intensive documentation of construction and
management thereof in order to provide assurance to the agency upon
review.70 The issues that surfaced in the operating license proceedings,
therefore, were mostly those of quality assurance, and the scope of these
proceedings was broad.
In an operating license proceeding, the utility carried the burden of
proving that the design was adequate and the plant had been constructed
accordingly.71 An application required a final safety analysis report.72
Consider the challenge for hopeful licensees: The implementation of each
66.
See, e.g., id. (noting how experts projected that nuclear facilities would be
relatively inexpensive when projects were initiated, which was not the reality when all was
said and done).
67.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (setting forth the license requirement).
68.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“The Commission
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the
proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.” (emphasis
added)).
69.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the typical issues in the
mandatory hearing in the construction permit proceeding were those related to site
suitability).
70.
See, e.g., Joseph F. Hennessey, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic
Energy Commission, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 495 (1974) (noting that issues that went
unresolved following the construction permit application review were triggering operating
license hearings in almost all cases in 1974).
71.
See, e.g., Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-24,
19 N.R.C. 1418, 1437 (1984) (noting that the applicant had the burden of proof once the
intervenor met the threshold for admitting contentions in an operating license proceeding).
72.
See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N., supra note 35, ¶ 15 (noting that
construction permit holders must submit a Final Safety Analysis Report with their operating
license applications).
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component was carried on by thousands of contractors and subcontractors
that the licensee had to manage; further, to ensure an adequate record for
agency review, a strict system of documented inspections was necessary.
While the public’s participation played a critical role in identifying safetyrelated components that were not implemented according to quality
assurance standards, that process also provided another avenue for
intervenors to inject chaos into the proceeding—they could buoy the project
for months or even years based on an administrative mishap as simple as
incomplete paperwork, even absent an underlying safety issue.73 Further,
this generation of reactors obtained construction permits at a time when
nuclear technology was largely underdeveloped; consequently, as the
industry matured and construction progressed, changes were necessarily
(and prudently) incorporated.74 This created a predicament in which a
preferable design technology could be challenged in the operating license
proceeding based on failure to comply with the construction permit,
notwithstanding the design’s safety superiority.75
The effect of the chaotic adjudicatory proceedings under the twostep licensing process and each of its inherent challenges discussed herein
converged with several external factors to halt the ordering of new nuclear
power facilities for over thirty years.76 Next, this Note will highlight the
specific defects of the process just outlined, defects which Congress and the
regulators intended to cure with the new licensing scheme.
B. What Went Wrong? The Defects of the Two-Step Licensing Process
To comprehend the problems of the bifurcated licensing process,
imagine the situation facing the project manager of a utility company
building a nuclear power facility under the Part 50 regulations, going before
the board of directors to discuss the company’s pending operating license
application. It is the eleventh hour in this two-step process; billions of
73.
See, e.g., Vance L. Sailor, The Role of the Lloyd Harbor Study Group in the
Shoreham Hearings—An Assessment, 28 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 25, 25 (1972)
(concluding that an opposition group “delayed construction . . . by at least two years,”
estimating the resulting “cost to the [utility’s] customers will be in excess of $100 million,”
and suggesting that was part of the strategy to prolong the proceeding rather than a concern
for safety).
74.
See, e.g., GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM:
THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946–1962 385 (1985) (noting that the “evolving
nature of atomic technology dictated revisions in design as a reactor facility moved from its
construction phase to operation”).
75.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(1) (2011) (requiring a construction to be completed in
conformance with the construction permit).
76.
See White House Office of Press Sec’y, supra note 1 and accompanying text
(noting that new nuclear plant construction has not taken place in the United States in over
three decades).
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dollars have been spent; costs are escalating while the license proceeding
ensues; an adverse finding might require tearing out a segment, going back
to the drawing board, redesigning, and rebuilding, setting the project back
even further financially and otherwise. And obtaining a license to operate is
anything but a certainty. Clearly, this was not an enviable position. The
projects of some hopeful vendors even met their demise at this stage—in
essence, continuing the proceedings became economically unviable—and a
new operating plant never became a reality.77
The old licensing process proved unworkable for several reasons,
and together these provided an impetus for the agency to promulgate the
Part 52 licensing regulations.78 First, this generation of hopeful nuclear
power vendors initiated their projects relying on unproven design, creating
an environment in which the risk involved in these projects was immense.79
Every aspect of the project had a great element of unpredictability: the
design might change with technological advancement, the influence of the
public in different phases was difficult to gauge, unforeseeable external
factors influenced costs and other aspects of a project, and critically, the
agency’s ultimate grant of a license to operate was anything but a certainty.
The new licensing scheme aims to capitalize on technological advances80
that allow for reliable standardization, which in turn will provide the
foundation for simplifying the management on the industry side and quality
assurance monitoring on the regulatory side, all of which will facilitate
safer and more efficient development of nuclear power plants.81
Second and closely related to unproven design, safety issues were
not fully resolved when the agency gave the approval to commence
construction.82 As was the case with most aspects of building, the safety
design took place throughout the construction phase, and assurance that
safety issues were adequately dealt with was not available until the NRC
77.
See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting
the fate of the Shoreham and Zimmer plants, which, with hundreds of millions of dollars of
sunken costs, decided to terminate their projects because pursing it further had become
economically unviable).
78.
See Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, supra note 35 (“In
an effort to improve regulatory efficiency and add greater predictability to the process, in
1989 the NRC established alternative licensing processes in 10 CFR Part 52 that included a
combined license.”).
79.
See Carl, supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the lack of design at the
construction permit application stage).
80.
See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,372 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting the
agency’s goals of safety and reliability that could come from utilizing standard designs,
which themselves have been made possible by advances in nuclear technology).
81.
See id. (noting that the agency’s rulemaking was in part driven by attaining
standardization and the enhanced safety that would be enabled by such standardization).
82.
See Carl, supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that a facility’s design was
typically only a concept when a licensee commenced construction).
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completed its review and granted an operating license. This further
contributed to the unpredictable nature of the project and made real the
possibility that the agency would deny an application for an operating
license based on design or similar issues.83 The Part 52 regulations aim to
resolve all safety and environmental issues before construction begins, thus
reducing the immense risk and providing some level of certainty before
enormous capital commitments are expended.84
Third, public participation under the old regulations was untimely
and chaotic. Further, the regulations had the unintended consequence of
allowing petitioners to use the process as a tactic against licensees.85 The
new regulations contemplate mechanisms for timely, meaningful
participation; yet, they limit the ability of opponents of nuclear power
generation to use the process as a weapon for stalling the proceedings and
forcing vendors to contribute resources to litigating frivolous issues.86
Each of these defects significantly contributed to the great
inefficiencies inherent in developing a nuclear power plant under the old
regime. Agency disapproval at the operating license review stage sent
applicants back to try again until they got it right.87 This regulatory flaw
eventually contributed to an environment in which projects became
economically unfeasible.88 The NRC, while acknowledging that its role was
not that of an economic regulator, took the lessons of history and
recognized that the viability of new nuclear development depended on the
83.
See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 17 (referring to the nuclear facilities
that encountered debilitating setbacks at the operating license stage). Note that the agency
did not outright deny an operating license in these proceedings; rather, repeated, adverse
findings contributed to escalating costs which eventually led to a business decision that the
projects were economically unfeasible.
84.
See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,373 (Apr. 18, 1989) (“The
Commission’s intent with this rulemaking is only to have a sensible and stable procedural
framework in place for the consideration of future designs, and to make it possible to resolve
safety and environmental issues before plants are built, rather than after.”).
85.
See supra Part II.A (describing how the timing and liberal grant of public
participation brought about chaotic licensing proceedings).
86.
See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,373 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting
that the agency’s goal is to create a stable licensing framework, not to keep the general
public out of the process); see also infra, note 148 and accompanying text (noting additional
protections in the form of legislative enactments that address this problem, particularly the
“Standby Support” Provision).
87.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (2011) (noting the requirements that must be met before the
agency’s issue of an operating license, implying that no license would be granted until the
applicant met each of those requirements).
88.
See Pierce, supra note 25 at 498–99 (discussing “mistakes in retrospect” among
the fleet of reactors initiated in the 1970s whereby economics precluded projects from
moving forward and some were even abandoned or cancelled after billions of dollars were
spent).
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creation of a proper incentive structure that would provide licensees with
regulatory stability.89 Next, this Note will turn to the product of that
undertaking.
C. The Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants in America: The New
Licensing Framework
In 1989, the NRC established new alternatives for nuclear plant
licensing that are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 52.90 Part 52 describes a threepart process in which a hopeful vendor may submit one application that
combines each of these three parts:91 an early site permit,92 standard design
certification,93 and a combined construction and operating license.94 The
combined license provides for a one-step process with a mandatory hearing
that aims to proceed more smoothly than hearings of the prior generation,
while continuing to give the public adequate opportunity to participate.95
1. Basics of the Part 52 Licensing Regulations with a Focus on the Novel
ITAAC Provisions
In order to avoid the problems inherent in the old process whereby
safety and environmental concerns remained after the issuance of a
construction permit,96 Part 52 allows an early site permit (“ESP”)
application to be filed, in which a vendor requests Commission approval of
89.
See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,376 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting
the sought-after regulatory stability that could eventually support standardization and the
benefits that would come with that).
90.
See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,386 (Apr. 18, 1989) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.
52) (setting forth a new part of the regulations specifying review procedures and licensing
applications for these new licenses and certifications).
91.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.8 (2010) (“An applicant for a license under this part may
combine in its application several applications for different kinds of licenses . . . [and] may
incorporate by reference in its application information contained in previous applications,
statements, or reports filed with the Commission.”).
92.
See id. at Subpart A (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application
for an Early Site Permit).
93.
See id. at Subpart B (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application
for standard Design Certifications).
94.
See id. at Subpart C (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application
for combined licenses).
95.
See id. at pt. 2, Subpart L (setting forth the informal hearing procedures for NRC
adjudications).
96.
See supra Part II.B at notes 82–84 (discussing the problems arising when a
construction permit was issued prior to complete resolution of safety and environmental
issues).
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the plant site itself.97 An early site permit resolves site safety,
environmental protection, and emergency preparedness issues, and the
review takes place exclusive of the specifics of actual reactor design.98 Both
prior to application and during NRC staff review, the NRC will generally
hold several meetings with the applicant that are open to the public in order
to provide the general public with access to information regarding the
safety and environmental aspects of the proposed project.99 The
Commission will hold a mandatory public hearing on the Early Site Permit
once the ACRS and NRC staffs have each completed their respective safety
reviews. However, unlike contentions under the old regulatory regime, a
stricter pleading standard must be met before the agency will admit
contentions in the mandatory hearing: “The presiding officer shall not admit
contentions proffered by any party concerning an assessment of the benefits
of construction and operation of the reactor or reactors, or an analysis of
alternative energy sources if those issues were not addressed by the
applicant in the early site permit application.”100
The ESP might be accompanied by an extremely useful regulatory
mechanism known as the limited work authorization (“LWA”), which
allows hopeful vendors to begin limited work at a site while a license or

97.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.12 (2010) (describing the scope of the early site permit
provisions).
98.
See id. § 52.17 (setting forth the technical information required in an application
for an early site permit, specifically, a site safety analysis report and a complete
environmental report, which include emergency plans and the proposed ITAAC related to
the proposed site of the facility); see also Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing
Process, supra note 35 (listing the ESP application requirements). The early site permit
should include the following:
[S]ite boundaries; seismic, meteorologic, hydrolic, and geologic data; location
and description of any industrial, military, or transportation facilities and
routes; existing and projected future population of the surrounding area;
evaluation of alternative sites; proposed general location of each plant planned
to be on the site; number, type[,] and power level of the plants planned for the
site; maximum discharges from the plant; type of plant cooling system to be
used; radiation dose consequences of hypothetical accidents; and plans for
coping with emergencies.
Id.
99.
See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,374 (April 18, 1989) (noting that
contrary to some allegations that the agency was attempting to remove the public from the
process, the NRC was moving the bulk of the direct public involvement to the front end of a
project).
100.
10 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2010). Compare id. (disallowing explicitly contentions that
suggest alternative energy sources), with Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11
N.R.C. at 545 (interpreting the Part 2 and Part 50 regulations to allow a contention that
suggested a marine biomass farm as an alternative to a nuclear power generation facility).
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permit application is under agency review.101 This authorizes performance
of non-safety site preparation activities to be carried on while the
application is under review, at the risk of the applicant.102
In another effort to avoid the uncertainties regarding design that
inundated the entire process under the two-step regime, the Part 52
regulations set forth the process for obtaining an agency-issued grant of a
standard design certification,103 which, if granted, is valid for fifteen
years.104 These provisions provide a means for simplifying the process and
approving a standard design (independent of any site) that may later be
incorporated into a combined license.105 The agency certifies a standard
design via a rulemaking process in which notice and an opportunity for
public comment are required.106 If certification is granted, the standard
design will be published in an appendix to the new licensing regulations.107
A novel addition to the Part 52 regulations is a requirement of each
application for a standard design certification:
[It] must . . . contain . . . [t]he inspections, tests, analyses,
and acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests,
and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met,
a facility that incorporates the design certification has been
constructed and will be operated in conformity with the
design certification provisions[.]108
101.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2010) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2010)) (authorizing
applicants to “perform the driving of piles, subsurface preparation, placement of backfill,
concrete, or permanent retaining walls within an excavation, installation of the
foundation . . . any of which are for [safety-related structures, systems, or components] of
the facility”). Note that this section cross-references the Part 50 regulations. This regulatory
vehicle was available under the old process as well.
102.
See id. § 50.10(f) (“Any activities undertaken under a [LWA] are entirely at the
risk of the applicant, and . . . the issuance of the [LWA] has no bearing on the issuance of a
construction permit or combined license with respect to the requirements of the Act, and
rules, regulations, or orders issued [thereunder].”).
103.
See id. § 52.41 (noting that the provisions set forth the requirements and
procedures for obtaining a standard design certification exclusive of a construction permit
under Part 50 or a combined license under Part 52).
104.
See id.§ 52.55(a) (“[A] standard design certification issued under this subpart is
valid for [fifteen] years from the date of issuance.”).
105.
See id. § 52.43 (noting that a combined operating license may incorporate a
standard design by reference to the standard design certification).
106.
See id. § 52.143 (stating that the NRC staff will make and publish a determination
of acceptability of a standard design after completion of its review and receipt of a report by
the ACRS). But see id. § 52.51(b) (noting that the Commission, in its discretion, may hold a
legislative-type hearing in a standard design certification review proceeding).
107.
Cf. id. § 52.145 (noting that the approved standard designs will be used and relied
upon in future applications for licenses that incorporate a design by reference).
108.
Id. § 52.47(b)(1).
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This provision sets forth one of the more innovative aspects of the new
licensing process, commonly referred to as the ITAAC review process.109
The third component part of the new regulatory scheme is the
combined construction and operating license (“COL”). A COL is an effort
to resolve the defects inherent in the bifurcated process by allowing an
applicant to incorporate by reference a preapproved standard reactor design
and site in its license application, which if granted is both a construction
license and a (conditional) operating license.110 Where uncertainty plagued
the two-step process, this mechanism of combining three parts into one step
is an effort to reduce the risk placed on the vendor by resolving issues on
the front end (before construction even begins and substantial financial
investment made).111
With the goal of enhancing efficiency and predictability, a COL
application allows an applicant to incorporate by reference an early site
permit and a design certification, essentially addressing all three parts in
one combined step.112 The COL application itself requires much of the
same information required under the two-step process.113
The mandatory hearing prior to the issuance of a construction
permit under the old Part 50 regulations remains in the new process at the
COL application stage.114 However, the mandatory proceeding under a Part
52 COL hearing proceeds in a vastly different manner from the construction
permit hearings of the previous generation of nuclear facilities, due in large
part to significant administrative changes promulgated by the NRC in
another effort to provide a more efficient licensing scheme.115 In 2004, the
109.
See infra Part III.A (providing a detailed discussion on the ITAAC review
process). Note that this regulatory innovation is not exclusive to the Design Certification
application. While the majority of ITAAC relate to design, the ESP and COL will each
contain ITAAC.
110.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.73 (2011) (noting the applicant’s opportunity to reference an
ESP or a Standard Design in its COL application); id. at § 52.8 (noting that applicants may
combine in order to avoid taking repetitive steps).
111.
See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,376 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting
the predictability fostered by the new licensing scheme).
112.
E.g., Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants, 72 Fed.
Reg. 49,352, 49,368 (Aug. 28, 2007) (noting the efficiency advantages of early resolution
and finality of issues).
113.
Compare 10 C.F.R. § 52.79 (2011) (setting forth the technical specifications
required under the new licensing process), with id. § 50.34 (setting forth the technical
specifications required under the old licensing process).
114.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (setting forth the
mandatory hearing requirement for commercial nuclear power generation licenses); see also
10 C.F.R. § 52.85 (2011) (setting forth the location of the procedural regulations to be
applied in the mandatory hearing proceedings).
115.
See Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,182 (Jan. 14, 2004)
(“The [NRC] is amending its regulations . . . to make the NRC’s hearing process more
effective and efficient.”). The NRC continued: “The final rule will fashion hearing
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NRC published a final rule in which reactor licensing hearings were to be
conducted in a less trial-type manner (pursuant to Subpart L) than those
required under the old protocol.116 Under the new process, in addition to
granting parties to a proceeding fewer discovery and cross examination
rights, the agency raised the bar for hopeful intervenors to gain standing
and submit contentions.117 In stark contrast to the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board’s liberal Allens Creek decision under the old
process discussed in Part II.A,118 the ASLB is taking a much harder line in
interpreting the standards for intervening and submitting contentions in the
mandatory informal hearings under Part 52: “[O]ur contention admissibility
‘requirements are deliberately strict, and we will reject any contention that
does not satisfy’ them.”119 While potential intervenors undoubtedly face a
higher standard for participating in a Part 52 combined license mandatory
hearing, the new informal procedures have been judicially challenged and
upheld as consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act,120 albeit with some hesitation.121
In addition to the revamped mandatory hearing process, an
application for a COL must also contain ITAAC.122 The closure of each

procedures that are tailored to the differing types of licensing and regulatory activities . . .
and will better focus the limited resources of involved parties and the NRC.” Id.
116.
See id. (setting forth more efficient hearing procedures for nuclear reactor
licensing proceedings). Compare 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpart L (2010) (setting forth a
streamlined hearing process characterized by a system of mandatory disclosure, see id. at
§ 2.336, restricted cross-examination rights, see id. at § 2.1204, and interrogation by the
presiding officer rather than the litigants, see id. at § 2.1207), with 10 C.F.R. pt. 2 subpart G
(1980) (setting forth the formal adjudicatory hearing process characterized by trial-type
procedures such as full discovery and direct and cross examination by the parties to the
proceeding).
117.
See Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,202 (Jan. 14, 2004)
(“The requirement to have specific contentions with a supporting statement of the facts
alleged or expert opinion that provides the bases for them in all hearings should focus
litigation on concrete issues and result in a clearer and more focused record for decision.”).
118.
See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (noting the appeal board’s liberal
interpretation of the standard for petitions for leave to intervene and the standard for
submitting contentions).
119.
See S. C. Elec. & Gas Co., Nos. 52–027, 52–028, 2010 WL 4057454, at *3
(N.R.C., Aug. 27, 2010) (affirming the 2010 ASLB decision denying the petition to
intervene and submit a contention that asserted the applicants “inadequately addressed the
need for power, energy alternatives, and costs and schedule for the proposed reactors”).
120.
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2011) (setting forth
the federal law governing procedure within administrative agencies).
121.
See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 351 (1st Cir.
2004) (“Though the Commission’s new rules may approach the outer bounds of what is
permissible under the APA, we find the statute sufficiently broad to accommodate them.”).
122.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.80 (2011) (setting forth the fact that a COL application must
contain ITAAC that if performed and met will demonstrate that a plant has been constructed
and will operate in conformity with the COL and all relevant statues and regulations). Recall
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ITAAC will serve as the condition that a facility must meet before the
agency will authorize a licensee to load fuel and operate; in other words, the
closed ITAAC will provide the agency reasonable assurance that the facility
conformed with the combined license in the construction process and will
be operated accordingly.123 A single application might contain several
hundred ITAAC, and some have well over a thousand that the applicant
must perform and the agency must approve.124 After the mandatory
combined license hearing, the Commission must identify all ITAAC125
prior to granting the combined license.126 Upon issuing a COL, the
Commission may find that certain ESP and design certification ITAAC
have been met. Such a finding will resolve those ITAAC with finality, and
they will be deemed closed.127
An applicant, having obtained a COL and identified the “open”
ITAAC, has the green light from the agency to commence construction,128
analogous to the position of a licensee holding a construction permit under
the old process. Plant construction will likely take several years, and the
ITAAC closure phase is ongoing throughout this period.129 During this
that early site permit and design certification applications also must contain ITAAC. See
supra note 18 for a thorough definition of ITAAC.
123.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (setting forth the procedure for closure within
the preoperational ITAAC review process).
124.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Luis A. Reyes, NRC Exec. Dir. of Operations on
Policy of Staff Approach to Verifying the Closure of ITAAC to the Comm’rs (Mar. 8, 2007)
(on file with the author). Note that a COL incorporates the ITAAC of the early site permit
and design certification. Most ITAAC are in fact defined in the design certification review
process, so a significant number were identified previously and are merely incorporated by
reference in a COL.
125.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.97(b) (2010) (“The Commission shall identify the . . . [ITAAC]
that, if met, are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has
been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the provisions of the
Act, and the Commission’s rules and regulations.”).
126.
See id. § 52.103 (noting the steps that must take place in order to obtain
authorization to operate under a combined license).
127.
See id. § 52.97(a)(2) (“[T]hose acceptance criteria have been met . . . [and] will be
deemed to be excluded from the combined license, and [further findings] with respect to
those acceptance criteria are unnecessary.”).
128.
See, e.g., id. § 50.10 (noting that no person may begin construction of a facility
prior to obtaining a COL); see also id. § 52.1 (setting forth the definition of a combined
license as a “combined construction permit and operating license with conditions for a
nuclear power facility,” which implicitly suggests the COL authorizes the licensee to begin
construction (emphasis added)). Note that the conditions referred to are the ITAAC, which
will become technical requirements identified by the Commission when it issues the
combined license. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text (describing what happens
with proposed ITAAC when the Commission issues a combined license).
129.
See id. § 52.99(c)(1) (“The licensee shall notify the NRC that the prescribed
inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and that the prescribed acceptance
criteria have been met. The notification must contain sufficient information to demonstrate
[as much].”).
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time, the licensee is to submit status updates informing the agency when
prescribed inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and that the
acceptance criteria have been met (i.e., the company is responsible for
seeing to it that each ITAAC is met and also for providing the agency with
notice of a basis for how the closure took place sufficient for NRC
review).130 It is the duty of the agency to ensure there was in fact
conformance and to publish notice of completion when appropriate.131
Under section 52.103, the licensee must notify the agency
approximately nine months prior to the scheduled date for loading fuel; the
agency is then required to publish a notice of intent to operate and provide
that “any person whose interest may be affected by operation of the plant
may . . . request a hearing on whether the facility as constructed complies,
or on completion will comply, with the acceptance criteria in the combined
license,” excepting ITAAC that have already been met under
section 52.97(a)(2).132 The regulations set forth a high threshold and narrow
scope for obtaining a hearing at this stage:133 It must be shown that one or
more of the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC have not or will not be met
and that the consequences of such failure will result in the inability of the
agency to provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety.134
Absent specific facts (rather than general, subjective concerns), there is no
basis for intervention and no grounds for a post-construction hearing.135
However, unlike the streamlined mandatory hearing that took place at the
COL stage,136 if the Commission grants a section 52.103(a) hearing, it has
discretion to conduct it under the informal adjudicatory process of Subpart
L or the formal adjudicatory process set forth in Subpart G.137 A licensee

130.
See id. § 52.99(a) (requiring licensees to submit notifications that implementation
has occurred and in six month intervals during the construction phase).
131.
See id. § 52.99(e) (setting forth the agency’s duty to inspect and notify the public).
132.
See id. § 52.103(a) (noting the requirements that the agency provide notice and
opportunity for a hearing prior to allowing operation under a combined license). This
provision also requires that a party who successfully requests a hearing shall be admitted as
a party to that hearing. Id.
133.
See § 2.309 (explaining the procedure for hearings and petitions to intervene and
the requirements for standing and contentions); see also supra notes 115–121 and
accompanying text (setting forth the more efficient process under the new regulations, along
with the heightened threshold for intervention).
134.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(b) (2011) (describing the requirements that must be shown
to request and become a party to a section 52.103(a) hearing).
135.
See id. (requiring specificity in a petition to intervene at this stage, particularly
with regard the specific consequences of alleged nonconformance).
136.
See id. § 2.310(a) (stating that combined license hearings may be conducted
pursuant to the streamlined procedures set forth in Subpart L).
137.
See id. §§ 52.103(d), 2.310(j) (noting the Commission’s discretion in choosing
informal or formal adjudication if a section 52.103(a) hearing is granted). Note that all
relevant hearings under the old two-step process proceeded according to the formal
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cannot operate a nuclear power generation facility until the Commission
makes a section 103(g) finding that all acceptance criteria in the combined
license have been met, and once that finding has been made, “all ITAAC
expire upon final Commission action in the proceeding.”138
Pause to consider the position of a licensee at this stage, by way of
contrast with the licensee who had just submitted an application for an
operating license under the two-step process, particularly in terms of the
investment spent and risk ahead.139 Whereas the agency conducted
significant quality assurance review during the operating license
proceedings under the old process, that role will take place continually
under the Part 52 regulations, throughout the construction phase. As the
apparent analog to the high-risk, uncertain, inefficient operating license
proceeding, it becomes clear that this novel and untested ITAAC review
process will be the significant ground upon which the new process’s
success in curing the defects of the two-step will be evaluated. While the
Part 52 regulations were first published over two decades ago, this process
is just now facing its defining moment.
2. Why the Delay? The Enabling Legislation
Before turning to an assessment of how the new process is
functioning in its nascent stage, a brief discussion of the legislation
supporting the new licensing scheme is warranted (in addition to the
Atomic Energy Act).140 The new regulations were first published in 1989;
however, combined license applications under Part 52 did not start flowing
into the NRC until 2007.141 Why the delay? Even after the NRC

adjudicatory procedures set forth in the old Subpart G, where broader discovery and crossexamination rights were recognized, among other things.
138.
See id. § 52.103(g), (h) (declaring that a finding that all ITAAC are met is a
prerequisite to operating a facility and that once that finding is official the ITAAC expire, no
longer serving as regulatory requirements since the technical aspects have been met).
139.
See supra Part II.B (setting forth the position of a hypothetical licensee at the
operating license application stage under the old bifurcated regulatory scheme and detailing
the defects of the Part 50 licensing regulations). Note the narrow scope that might be at issue
in a hearing at this phase under Part 52, the ability to predict, and the amount of control the
licensee has over abating the risk of the Commission granting a contested hearing, in
comparison with an operating license hearing under Part 50.
140.
See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text (describing the organic statute of
the Atomic Energy Commission, NRC’s predecessor).
ENERGY
INST.,
NEW
NUCLEAR
PLANT
STATUS,
141.
See
NUCLEAR
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/graphicsandcharts/newnucl
earplantstatus/ (last updated Jan. 2011) (displaying the NRC combined licensing applicants
and relevant application information in chart form) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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implemented
its
efficiency-enhancing
regulations,142
economic
considerations continued to be an obstacle to initiating new nuclear
projects.143
The NRC had limited tools at its disposal to create an environment
conducive to stimulating investment in nuclear development given that its
role was not that of an economic regulator.144 Recognizing the need for
government support of expanding the nuclear energy industry, Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”).145 Several provisions
applicable to the nuclear industry set forth economic incentives that have
been serving as the long-awaited impetus to get firms to invest in the new
nuclear power industry.
First, the loan guarantee program supports innovative nuclear
technology and guarantees that the Secretary of Energy will cover up to
eighty percent of project cost for investment in technology that reduces
carbon emissions.146 Second, the production tax credit allows the Secretary
of Treasury to permit a 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour tax credit to qualified
nuclear facilities that may be in effect for up to eight years once a facility
begins to operate.147 Third, the “Standby Support” provision allows the
Secretary of Energy to enter into contracts to cover delays related to this
generation’s early reactors, including delays caused by failure of the NRC
to comply with inspection, review, and hearing schedules, along with

142.
See supra note 115 (noting the 2004 amendments promulgated to streamline the
hearing process).
143.
See SCULLY CAPITAL, BUSINESS CASE FOR NEW NUCLEAR REACTORS 11 (Oct. 1,
2002), available at http://www.ne.doe.gov/home/bc/ExecOverviewNERAC100102.pdf
(recognizing in 2002 that early plant capital costs are so high that government assistance
might be necessary to finance nuclear projects).
144.
See The Commission, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commfuncdesc.html (last visited April 16, 2012)
(“The Commission as a collegial body formulates policies, develops regulations governing
nuclear reactor and nuclear material safety, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal
matters.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
145.
See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 595 (mostly
codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Energy Policy Act]
(setting forth Congress’ comprehensive legislative effort to address escalating energy
problems); see also SCULLY CAPITAL, supra note 143, at 4 (noting the market context and
suggesting the environmental and energy advantages of nuclear power).
146.
See Energy Policy Act, supra note 145, §§ 1701–04 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 16,511–16,514) (setting forth the Act’s loan guarantee provision for innovative energy
technology).
147.
See id. § 1306 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45J) (setting forth the tax credit for
production from advanced nuclear power facilities). Note that to be eligible for this tax
credit, the COL must have been submitted prior to 2009, the plant must be under
construction by 2014, and it must be operating by 2021. Id.
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litigation delays.148 These provisions, among others, comprise the enabling
legislation that has set this nuclear renaissance in motion. Next, this Note
will provide observations of the new licensing scheme in its infancy.
3. The Test Case: Plant Vogtle
The scene at Southern Company’s Vogtle site in eastern Georgia is
a sight to behold: Steam billows from Vogtle Units 1 and 2 in the
background on the 3,100-acre site along the Savannah River, where the
sound of heavy machinery is in the air and nearly two thousand contractors
and other employees are working—at desks in trailers and in bulldozers that
move dirt around two massive holes (each the size of five football fields) in
an area that has been cleared and excavated pursuant to the limited work
authorization filed in conjunction with the ESP application.149 This is all in
preparation for the construction of Plant Vogtle’s anticipated third and
fourth nuclear reactors, which may begin once the NRC issues what many
expect to be the very first Part 52 combined construction and operating
license.150 Southern Company expects to receive approval of their
combined license later this year.151
With Vogtle leading the way, the new licensing scheme seems to be
functioning smoothly so far: Southern Company was able to obtain an early
site permit and limited work authorization and to incorporate by reference
148.
See id. § 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16041) (setting forth the Act’s Standby
Support provision for certain nuclear plant delays). This provision provides that the
Department of Energy will pay 100% of covered costs for the first two reactors that have
received a combined license under Part 52 and for which construction has begun. It will
provide 50% coverage for the next four reactors that meet the same requirements.
149.
See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory vehicle
known as the limited work authorization); see also Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ESP Site, Early Site Permit and Limited Work
Authorization,
No.
52–011,
ESP–004
(Aug.
26,
2009),
available
at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0922/ML092290157.pdf (setting forth the details of the
ESP and LWA for Southern Company’s Vogtle site, including accompanying ITAAC in
Appendix E).
150.
See Pavey, supra note 29 (“Although site preparation is under way for the $14.5
billion project, work on the reactors cannot begin until the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission issues the combined license authorizing both the construction and operation of
the units.”).
COMPANY,
151.
See
Milestones,
SOUTHERN
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/milestones.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (setting forth the timeline of the Vogtle project thus far, along with anticipated
milestones) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Author’s
note: Approval of the COL was granted on February 9, 2012, allowing full construction to
commence. See Press Release, Southern Company, Southern Company Subsidiary Receives
Historic License Approval for New Vogtle Units, Full Construction Set to Begin (Feb. 9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/presskit/docs/COL_press_release.pdf.
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applications for the Vogtle ESP and an amendment to a standard design
certification within its COL application, all within a three year span.152
Southern Company also secured a conditional $8.3 million loan guarantee
for the Vogtle units pursuant to the loan guarantee program set forth in the
Energy Policy Act.153
In addition to the apparent functioning from industry’s perspective,
it seems the regulatory framework is providing adequate opportunity for
public participation at this stage, despite the expressed hard line regarding
interventions and contentions.154 Consider the Vogtle COL proceeding in
which several joint petitioners sought to intervene, relying on three separate
contentions.155 After granting standing to the joint petitioners,156 the ASLB
rejected two of the three contentions for failure to meet the pleading
requirements157 and admitted the third as a contention of omission.158 This
ruling suggests two things—first, the public still appears to have a legally
sufficient opportunity to participate in these proceedings, and second, this is
so despite the board’s strict construction of the procedural rules, unlike the
ASLB in the 1970s and 1980s that essentially interpreted the Part 2
intervention procedures out of the rule.159
Even so, the new licensing scheme is about to be put to the test.
Currently, the NRC has issued four early site permits and has two other
152.
See id. (noting the ESP was filed in August 2006 and granted in August 2009, with
all other events transpiring in the interim).
153.
See, e.g., Peter Behr, DOE Delivers Its First, Long-Awaited Nuclear Loan
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
2010),
available
at
Guarantee,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/02/17/17climatewire-doe-delivers-its-first-longawaited-nuclear-71731.html?pagewanted=all (announcing the first loan guarantee obtained
by Southern Company for its Vogtle units).
154.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the agency’s heightened
threshold for granting petitions to intervene in the informal adjudicatory process).
155.
See S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. 139, 167, 2009 WL 3812209 (2009)
(holding that the joint petitioners established standing to intervene and put forth one
sufficient contention to grant them party status in the proceeding).
156.
See id. at 150–51 (granting standing to each individual petitioners that filed the
joint petition to intervene).
157.
See id. at 155 (finding the contentions related to the Westinghouse design
revisions “inadmissible in that these contentions and their foundational support [have] failed
to proffer a specific, sufficiently supported, material issue regarding a safety concern
associated with the interaction between the pending [design revisions and the COL
application]”).
158.
See id. at 160 (holding that the safety contention is “admitted in that this
contention and its foundational support are sufficient to establish a genuine material dispute
adequate to warrant further inquiry”).
159.
See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (noting the ASLB’s
interpretation of the procedural rules under Part 52 proceedings thus far); see also N. States
Power Co., 68 N.R.C. 905, 912 (2008) (granting the petition for intervention but only after a
strict reading of the procedural requirements required to intervene and a supplemental
affidavit submitted by petitioners to satisfy the procedural requirements).
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applications under review;160 it has issued four design certifications and has
six others under review (including one renewal application);161 and it has
eighteen applications for a combined license covering a total of twentyseven reactors under agency review.162 While Southern Company’s Vogtle
units are predicted to lead the way, other applicants are moving forward as
well.163 All of this activity begs the question, Will the Part 52 regulations
provide adequate public participation and a sufficiently stable framework to
carry this fleet forward? Next, this Note discusses the problems that must
be addressed to ensure this generation of nuclear facilities will avoid the
fate of the precedent fleet, in which, for example, the Shoreham project
went under even before reaching the fuel loading stage.164
III. Weathering the Storm: Challenges Facing the New Fleet of Reactors
The quality assurance review that largely took place during the Part
50 operating license proceeding will substantially occur in the preoperational ITAAC review process of the new licensing scheme. A hopeful
licensee includes all necessary ITAAC in each application submitted to the
NRC staff, which in turn will define the ITAAC in the combined license,
either for the first time or by way of reference to ITAAC in the early site

160.
See Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011)
(listing the Vogtle, Clinton, Grand Gulf, and North Anna as approved sites and the Victoria
and PSEG sites as under review) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
161.
See Design Certification Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2011 ) (listing the ABWR, System 80+, AP600, and AP1000 as approved design
certifications and several other designs as currently under review) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
162.
See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011)
(listing the reactors having pending COL applications currently before the NRC, along with
the Calloway Plant, for which application review was suspended in June 2009) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). These reactors
are Bell Bend, Bellefonte (2), Calvert Cliffs, Comanche Peak (2), Fermi, Grand Gulf, Levy
County (2), Nine Mile Point, North Anna, River Bend Station, Shearon Harris (2), South
Texas (2), Turkey Point (2), Victoria County Station (2), Virgil C. Summer (2), Vogtle (2),
and William States Lee III (2). Id.
163.
See, e.g., S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., [CLI-10-21] (denying remaining portion of
intervention petition and terminating the contested portion of the Virgil C. Summer COL
proceeding). Note that the COL application for this nuclear power facility did not utilize the
limited work authorization, nor did it incorporate by reference an early site permit, by way
of contrast with the manner Southern Company proceeded under Part 52 for its Vogtle plant.
164.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the final projects that went
under in the context of the two-step licensing process).
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permit and standard design certification.165 Section 52.1 defines a combined
license as “a combined construction permit and operating license with
conditions for a nuclear power facility . . . .”166 The license is conditioned
upon a licensee performing the hundreds or even thousands of predefined167 inspections, tests, and analyses and an agency finding that the
licensee has in fact met all pre-defined acceptance criteria, which together
will provide the basis for the agency’s determination that it does or does not
have reasonable assurance the plant will be safely operated in conformance
with the COL.168 From the moment construction begins, each licensee will
have the blueprint for exactly what it must do to obtain agency approval to
begin operating, as described in each individual ITAAC. The efficiency and
predictability advantages seem obvious when compared to the two-step
process in which construction permit holders designed as they built (with
no comparable blueprint to guide them) and were subject to a quality
assurance evaluation with near unlimited scope and somewhat
unpredictable evaluation criteria in the operating license proceedings.169
Prior to gaining approval to operate under Part 52, the public has an
opportunity to request a hearing; however, the regulations define the scope
of these proceedings very narrowly and require a showing that specific
ITAAC have not and will not be met and that such failure precludes a
finding that there is reasonable assurance of the public health and safety.170
On its face, it might appear the regulatory scheme provides for a seamless
process that will provide stability for this nuclear renaissance to charge
forward.
However, two significant and interlocking issues stand in the way.
First, the ITAAC closure process and maintenance period (likely to span
several years) proceed without public participation until the section 103(a)
hearing opportunity presents itself toward the very end of the construction
phase.171 Under certain factual circumstances, the text of the provision
165.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the how the ITAAC are
defined in the combined construction and operating license).
166.
10 C.F.R. § 52.1 (2011) (emphasis added).
167.
These ITAAC are pre-defined in the COL.
168.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that the closed ITAAC provide
the NRC staff with the basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that a nuclear facility will
be operated safely and in accordance with the license).
169.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the uncertainty of design at this
stage of the process under Part 50).
170.
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (setting forth the two strict prima
facie requirements that are necessary for the agency to grant a request for a section 103(a)
hearing).
171.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.99 (2011) (describing the ITAAC closure process, which
consists of detailed reporting on the part of licensees to provide a sufficient basis to ensure
the agency that the ITAAC have been met, but which does not provide for public
participation aside from the agency’s duty to publish notices of the closed ITAAC).
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setting forth the pre-operational ITAAC hearing is internally contradictory
and legally impermissible on two separate grounds, discussed in Part III.A.
Further, the regulations do not conclusively settle what precise procedures
will be used in these section 103(a) ITAAC review hearings,172 leaving
open the question of whether or not these proceedings will be legally
permissible under the Administrative Procedure Act.173
Second, while design standardization has significantly improved,
these projects will last several years, and during this time design and other
changes will be inevitable.174 While the regulations provide a mechanism
for altering a site characteristic or design parameter that does not trigger
significant procedural requirements, this is only available if the variance is
granted prior to the issuance of a combined license.175 Once a COL is
issued, any change requires an amendment, which triggers a hearing
opportunity.176 With the hearing opportunity that arises with each
amendment, this tranche of reactors is facing an effective reversion to the
hearing delays and cost-escalation problems that characterized the two-step
process. And activity under Part 52 thus far suggests that amendments will
in fact be sought: Westinghouse, the company that designed one of the four
standard design certifications issued to date by the NRC, currently has its
amended AP1000 reactor design under agency review and submitted its
eighteenth revision to that amendment late last year.177 Even though the
interplay that will occur between these issues will be significant, for

172.
See id. § 52.103(e), (f), (g) (referring generally to the “Commission” in setting
forth the section 103(a) hearing procedures and leaving the decision of whether to choose a
formal or informal adjudicatory hearing procedure at the discretion of the “Commission”).
173.
See, e.g., Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act § 4
(1947) (prepared by the United States Department of Justice Tom Clark, Attorney General)
(noting the requirements set forth in section 5(b) for a certain level of public participation for
interested parties in all administrative adjudicatory proceedings).
174.
These design and other changes will also have implications in the ITAAC review
process, as any alteration will likely require a change to the blueprint, the predefined ITAAC
set forth in the COL, hence the interlocking nature of these two issues.
175.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.93(c) (2011) (allowing an applicant to seek a variance to which
the Commission will apply the same criteria as if it had been in the original application so
long as the variance is obtained prior to the issuance of a combined license).
176.
See id. § 52.98(f) (“Any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms
and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to, addition to, or deletion
from the [ITAAC] contained in the license is a proposed amendment to the license. There
must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment.” (emphases added)).
177.
See Robynne Boyd, Safety Concerns Delay Approval of the First U.S. Nuclear
Reactor in Decades, SCI. AM., July 29, 2010 (noting that the amendment to the AP1000
reactor design was on its eighteenth revision); see also Design Certification Application
Review, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/designcert/amended-ap1000.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (stating that Westinghouse submitted
its eighteenth revision to the NRC on December 1, 2010) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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discussion purposes, this Note addresses the issues associated with the
ITAAC review process and amendments in turn.
A. Public Participation in the ITAAC Process: Definition, Implementation,
and Closeout
While ITAAC are defined (and redefined) throughout the early site
permit, design certification, and combined license application proceedings
(and beyond), the period in which the agency may begin to issue findings
that ITAAC have been met (the “closeout” phase) does not begin until the
combined license is issued.178 As a result, the manner in which ITAAC
closeout will function in reality remains to be determined since the agency
has not yet issued a COL; however, that phase is imminent, as the agency
grant of the COL in connection with Southern Company’s Vogtle Units 3
and 4 is predicted to take place later this year.179 Essentially, the closeout
phase will be finalized with the agency’s section 103(g) finding and
subsequent termination of the proceeding, which will serve as the final
regulatory step before loading fuel under Part 52.180 This step is analogous
to the issuance of an operating license under the bifurcated licensing
scheme and similarly serves as the last step to ensure reasonable assurance
that the operating plant will not endanger the public’s health and safety.181
In short, the stakes of getting the pre-operational ITAAC review process
right are high.
Consider the lifespan of a single hypothetical ITAAC contained in
an early site permit:182 First, the applicant must set forth the proposed
ITAAC in its application;183 at the conclusion of the proceeding the agency
178.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.97(a)(2) (2011) (setting forth the first time the NRC may issue
a finding regarding ITAAC, which is when it issues a combined license, at which time it
may close ITAAC related to an early site permit or a standard design certification that was
referenced in the COL application). The agency may close the ITAAC if the closure is
warranted. Id.
179.
See, e.g., James M. Hylko, Plant Vogtle Leads the Next Nuclear Generation,
MAG.,
Nov.
1,
2009,
at
2,
available
at
POWER
http://www.powermag.com/issues/features/Plant-Vogtle-Leads-the-Next-NuclearGeneration_2247_p2.html (“The NRC has scheduled completion of the Vogtle final safety
evaluation report in April 2011. Southern Nuclear expects to receive its COL later in 2011
and then immediately begin safety-related construction.”).
180.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (stating that a facility shall not operate until a
finding under this section is made, implying that this is the final step before loading fuel).
181.
See id. § 50.57 (providing agency authorization for a facility to begin operating
upon issuance of a license under this subsection).
182.
Assume for the purposes of this hypothetical that the early site permit will be
granted and later incorporated by reference into the applicant’s combined license, which will
also be granted.
183.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(3) (2011) (“Emergency plans submitted under . . . this
section must include the proposed [ITAAC].”).
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will issue an early site permit if it finds the applicant’s proposed ITAAC is
necessary and sufficient to ensure reasonable assurance of conformance
with the ESP (and thus public health and safety);184 with the defined
ITAAC serving as an applicant’s blueprint for that particular component,
the applicant will be responsible for implementing it as prescribed and then
reporting as much to the agency “with sufficient information to demonstrate
that the [ITAAC has] been met;”185 with this information the agency has the
duty to ensure proper implementation186 and to make a finding that the
acceptance criteria has been met;187 finally, the agency will close the
ITAAC upon a section 103(g) finding and final commission action in the
proceeding, at which point the ITAAC will expire.188
To date, it appears the new regulatory scheme provides adequate,
albeit more limited, opportunity for public participation through the
combined license proceeding stage (that is, the procedures are in
conformance with the APA).189 But what about the pre-operational ITAAC
review process? In the hypothetical set forth above, an opportunity to
request a hearing is only available at two junctures.190 First, it is available
during the definitional phase (which is finalized upon issuance of an early
site permit, standard design certification, or combined license depending on
the ITAAC),191 and second, during the closure phase, which consists of a
final finding that the ITAAC has been met and takes place either upon

184.
See id. § 52.24(a)(5) (noting that agency approval of the applicant’s proposed
ITAAC is necessary for the issuance of an early site permit).
185.
Id. § 52.99(c)(1).
186.
See id. § 52.99(e) (“The NRC shall ensure that the prescribed inspections, tests,
and analyses in the ITAAC are performed.”).
187.
See id. § 52.103(g) (noting the Commission finding (a “section 103(g) finding”)
that the ITAAC has been met is a prerequisite to operating a facility).
188.
See id. § 52.103(g), (h) (describing how an official agency finding that the ITAAC
has been met causes the ITAAC to expire, which means it no longer constitutes a regulatory
requirement for licensees while operating or seeking license renewal). Note that this finding
may also take place when the agency issues a COL, and such a finding has a similar effect,
in that the ITAAC expires and essentially no longer exists. Id. § 52.97(a)(2).
189.
See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (describing the apparent adequate
opportunity for public participation under Part 52 thus far, at this admittedly early stage); see
also supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (noting judicial approval of the new
administrative procedures in response to an APA challenge).
190.
For explanatory purposes, this hypothetical does not account for the possibility of
amendments, which will also trigger an opportunity to request a hearing. In reality, these
issues will be intertwined. This Note discusses amendments separately in Part III.B, supra.
191.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.24(b) (noting that all terms and conditions of an early site
permit, including ITAAC, have been met or will serve as conditions of a combined license
and are thus defined); see also id. § 52.54(b) (noting that all requirements must be specified
when the standard design certification is issued); id. § 52.97(b) (noting the same for issuance
of a combined license).
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issuance of a combined license192 or with a section 103(g) finding.193 The
fact that the scope of these proceedings is limited is not problematic in and
of itself.194 However, in current form, when certain factual circumstances
present themselves the regulations become inherently contradictory and
therefore violative of the policy imperative set forth in the agency’s own
organic statute, rendering the regulation ultra vires.195 The hypothetical
helps illustrate exactly why section 52.103 is inconsistent with the NRC’s
organic statute. Suppose the agency adopts the ITAAC definition proposed
by the applicant when it issues the early site permit, the proceeding goes
forward uncontested, the COL (referencing the early site permit including
this ITAAC) has been issued, and plant construction is underway. Suppose
further that a member of the public discovers that the ITAAC is materially
flawed—that the performed inspections, tests, and analyses would not in
fact provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety, even if
the acceptance criteria were met. The requirements to request a section
103(a) hearing would bar the interested party from even making such a
request, if strictly construed: a prima facie showing that the ITAAC has not
or will not be met and the specific, harmful operational consequences that
will result is not possible under this hypothetical.196 In other words, a strict
application of the procedural requirements set forth in the regulations,
which also state that interested parties must be afforded the opportunity to
request a hearing, preclude a party from requesting a hearing since they
cannot make a prima facie showing that the ITAAC has not and will not be
met. So undiscovered safety issues, which (quite obviously) were not
addressed in the (flawed) ITAAC definition phase, cannot be challenged so
long as the applicant adequately performs the defined inspections, tests, and
analyses, meets the defined acceptance criteria, and the agency finds
conformance therewith.197
192.
See id. § 52.97(a)(2) (describing the process for closing ITAAC when the COL
issues, which similarly “will finally resolve that those [ITAAC] have been met, [and] those
acceptance criteria will be deemed to be excluded from the combined license” and further
findings with respect to those ITAAC are unnecessary).
193.
See supra notes 188, 192, and accompanying text (describing when official
ITAAC closure and expiration takes place).
194.
See supra notes 119–121 (noting the strict admissibility requirements set forth in
the regulations and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s strict interpretation of those
requirements). This statement is speculative to a degree; however, if the ASLB is consistent
in its procedural interpretation, these later hearings will be subject to the same strict scrutiny
that has been consistently applied in the proceedings to date.
195.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2011) (setting forth
Congress’s intent in passing the Act, notably its goal that the use of nuclear power be
directed at improving the general welfare).
196.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (setting forth the standards required for
requesting a hearing).
197.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (stating that a closure for a specific ITAAC
requires only a finding that the pre-defined acceptance criteria have been met).
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In the event that an attentive member of the public uncovers a
materially flawed ITAAC definition phase, the regulation’s procedural
structure precludes the interested party from exercising the right to request
a hearing granted explicitly in section 103(a) by the procedural
requirements in section 103(b). Sections 103(a) and (b) are inherently
contradictory under a certain, probable fact pattern (as was the case in the
hypothetical just described).198 Taking the hypothetical one step further,
suppose the materially flawed ITAAC, if uncorrected, might cause
substantial safety hazards to the community surrounding a generation
facility. Under these circumstances, the regulatory procedures are legally
impermissible in at least two ways. First, a strict interpretation of section
103(b) will lead the agency to authorize plant operation when operation will
cause significant and detrimental health and safety consequences that will
be harmful to the general welfare in violation of the agency’s organic
statute.199
Second, the current regulation is structured to accommodate due
process violations against individual litigants. Agency adjudication carries
with it constitutional due process hearing rights.200 Suppose the agency does
not allow a hearing on the flawed ITAAC based on the interested party’s
failure to meet the prima facie requirements necessary to request a hearing,
resulting in the termination of a proceeding and the nuclear facility going
on line. The applicable due process framework was set forth by the
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly.201 The interested party would have a
cause of action if it could show that, on balance, (1) the agency action has
caused some substantial deprivation to the interested party resulting from
failure to consider the materially flawed ITAAC in the proceeding, (2) the
governmental interest in not allowing the hearing was minimal, and (3) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest involved resulting from the
procedure (not) used was a near certainty and, along the same line, that

198.
See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text (setting forth the strict prima
facie requirements necessary for the agency to grant a request for an ITAAC hearing and the
admission requirements once a hearing is granted).
199.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2011) (“[T]he development,
use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve
the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in
private enterprise.”).
200.
See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).
201.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (articulating a three-part balancing
framework to determine whether a procedural due process violation has occurred when
benefits were terminated without notice or a hearing and holding that such violation did in
fact occur).
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additional procedural safeguards would have had substantial value in
protecting the interest at stake.202
In addition to these legal problems, other issues will likely surface.
The applicant is at the helm throughout the ITAAC implementation
phase.203 With no required agency oversight and no comparable, explicit
role for members of the public, assurance of compliance with each ITAAC
is based almost entirely on the information submitted by the applicant to the
agency to demonstrate that the applicant complied.204 Similarly, the
regulations grant the agency discretion in choosing whether to conduct a
section 103(a) hearing according to formal or informal adjudicatory
procedures.205 While this is not necessarily legally problematic, the manner
in which these proceedings are conducted will certainly be subject to close
scrutiny to ensure the processes adopted comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in the APA. In its decision in Citizens Awareness
Network, Inc.,206 the First Circuit sent a strong message to the agency in
particular: “Should the agency’s administration of the new rules contradict
its present representations or other wise flout [the APA’s principles],
nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules against future challenges.”207
B. Responding to Change in a Frontloaded Regulatory Scheme
Under the bifurcated licensing scheme, most questions remained
unanswered until the licensee was ready to load fuel.208 With the lessons
from the generation of plants licensed under Part 50, the agency retooled by
moving major decisions to the beginning of the process, limiting procedural
formality of licensing proceedings, and narrowing the scope of those
proceedings—with the goal of providing for timely, meaningful
participation, settling issues on the front end, and providing licensees with a
202.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (applying Goldberg’s threepart balancing framework in an administrative adjudication to determine whether a
procedural due process violation had occurred when benefits were terminated without an
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing).
203.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.99(b), (c) (2011) (granting a licensee the authority to proceed
“at its own risk with design and procurement activities” with regard to activities subject to
ITAAC, stating only that the applicant must perform and meet all ITAAC (with no required
oversight) and subsequently provide sufficient notice to demonstrate they have complied).
204.
See id. § 52.99(c)(1) (“The notification must contain sufficient information to
demonstrate that the described inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and the
prescribed acceptance criteria have been met.”). NRC findings are based almost exclusively
on the information provided in these periodic reports.
205.
See id. § 52.103(d) (setting forth the Commission’s discretion in choosing the
procedure for a section 103(a) hearing).
206.
Citizen’s Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004).
207.
See Citizen’s Awareness Network, 391 F.3d at 354 (setting forth a caveat to the
ruling that the NRC’s procedural rules do not violate the Administrative Procedure Act).
208.
See supra Part II.B (noting the inefficiencies of the old regulatory scheme).
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sort of blueprint increased certainty—all to reduce the risks involved in
nuclear power projects.209 In a static world, this framework might prove
infallible; however, in a construction phase that spans upwards of ten years
that is affected by countless external factors—a spike in commodity prices,
unrest in a supply nation, natural disaster, political crisis, and everything in
between—change is inevitable.
The importance of providing an opportunity for a hearing for
certain license amendments cannot be understated; however, the overbreadth of the amendment requirements210 has already proven problematic,
which indicates that this problem will only be exacerbated in the context of
a combined license proceeding.211 Unless the agency revises its approach to
handling changes throughout the development of a nuclear facility, the
current amendment and hearing provisions set this fleet on course for an
effective reversion to the delays and cost increases characteristic of the twostep process. The “dirt issue” at Southern Company’s Vogtle’s site
demonstrates how.
With its combined license pending,212 Southern Company charged
forward with excavation activities pursuant to its Limited Work
Authorization and authorized by its early site permit.213 In its August 2006
ESP application, Southern Company made reference to the specific dirt to
be used for backfill at the excavation site.214 Later, it became apparent that
they needed more dirt than was available in the location specified, implying
a change to the ESP would be necessary, and the agency strictly adhered to
the regulation by requiring Southern Company to file a licensing
209.
See supra Part II.C (describing the regulatory regime under Part 52).
210.
See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 52.98(f) (2010) (“Any modification to, addition to, or
deletion from the terms and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to,
addition to, or deletion from the [ITAAC] contained in the license is a proposed amendment
to the license. There must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment.”); see also id.
§ 52.39(e) (“The holder of an early site permit may not make changes to the early site
permit, including the site safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval. The
request for a change to the [ESP] must be in the form of an application for a license
amendment . . . .”). These provisions refer to amendments to a combined license or ESP,
respectively, and only the former triggers the hearing opportunity. Note that modifications to
a standard design certification are not permitted unless the Commission makes certain
findings in a rulemaking. See generally id. § 52.63.
211.
See, e.g., id. § 52.98(f) (noting that an amendment automatically triggers hearing
rights). This is only the case in the combined license context.
212.
See generally Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Acceptance for Docketing of An
Application for Combined License for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Nos.
52-025 & 52-026 (ML 081480138), May 30, 2008.
213.
See generally Nuclear Regulatory. Comm’n, Early Site Permit and Limited Work
Authorization, ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 092290157), Aug. 29, 2009.
214.
See Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Early Site Permit Application,
Part 2—Site Safety Analysis Report, at 2.5.4-20–2.5.4-22 (ML 062290272), Aug. 31, 2006
(detailing specifics of backfill).
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amendment.215 The amendments (the first was followed by two subsequent
amendments related to backfill) were eventually granted.216 The effect of
these amendments was the approval of the following: alternative sources of
onsite dirt not set forth in the ESP, the use of that alternative dirt (not
initially described in the ESP), and the reclassification of that dirt.217
However, authorization to take and use dirt from an alternative onsite
location was not granted before the frenzy of dealing with the innumerable
details arose—the NRC and others comprehensively addressed certain
impacts of the proposed changes, for example the impact on Southeastern
Pocket Gophers,218 over the course of several conference calls219—all in the
name of determining whether granting an amendment to use different dirt
would be okay.
Considering the multitude of changes that inevitably will present
themselves, the consequences of requiring an amendment for insignificant
changes will be detrimental, even with the mechanisms built into the
regulations to expedite the process under certain circumstances.220 When
changes are negligible, the licensee’s resources are wasted, the NRC staff is
diverted away from important agency functions, and the door is left open
for intervenors who want to bring chaos to a proceeding in order to halt the
progress of a project. While frontloading the planning and decision-making
processes was a laudable means to obtaining the agency’s objectives,221 the
efforts will be for naught without some mechanism to handle insignificant
215.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.39(e) (2011) (requiring an amendment for any change to the
ESP, including a change to the site safety analysis report (emphasis added)).
216.
See generally Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and
Limited Work Authorization, Amendment No. 3 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101870522),
July 9, 2010.
217.
See id. (describing Southern Company’s third amendment related to backfill);
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and Limited Work
Authorization, Amendment No. 2 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101760370), June 25, 2010
(describing Southern Company’s second amendment related to backfill); Nuclear
Regulatory. Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and Limited Work Authorization,
Amendment No. 1 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101400509), May 21, 2010 (describing
Southern Company’s third amendment related to backfill).
218.
Southeastern Pocket Gophers are burrowing rodents that fall into the “Least
Concern” category according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, which
assigns conservation status to all species. If placed on a continuum, the “Least Concern”
category sits on the polar opposite extreme of those species that are listed as extinct.
219.
Summary of the Teleconference Calls Held with the Georgia Department of
Natural Resources for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 Onsite Backfill
Amendment (ML 101670079), May–June 2009.
220.
See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 50.91(a)(6) (2010) (setting forth the provision that allows for
abbreviated procedures in exigent circumstances so long as the agency determines the
amendment involves “no significant hazards considerations”). This provision was utilized by
the NRC when it addressed the “dirt” issue at the Vogtle site.
221.
See supra Part II.B (describing the risk-reduction, efficiency, and predictabilityenhancing as objectives of the new licensing scheme).
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modifications. Further, absent some flexibility to handle change, hopeful
licensees will have an incentive to minimize specificity in their application
in order to avoid their own “dirt” issue, creating a whole new set of
problems.
IV. Staying Afloat: How to Achieve a Stable Regulatory Framework that
Can Support a Thriving Nuclear Industry
If the combined license proceedings carry on as predicted, we may
witness the beginning of construction of the first facility among this tranche
of reactors by year’s end.222 With Southern Company’s current cost
projections at $14.5 billion and the fact that the Vogtle units are just two of
the twenty-seven proposed reactors on deck, the agency, industry, and the
American public cannot afford a failure to fix the regulatory flaws set forth
in Part III.
A. Effective Management in the Context of Nuclear Development
In order to effectively address the ITAAC review and amendment
issues, both industry members and the NRC face significant challenges
going forward. Flawless management will be critical. Not only is effective
management (in this complex setting) essential to ensuring a safe operating
facility that enhances the general welfare,223 but it is also essential to
gaining the public’s trust. Exemplary management requires painstaking
documentation of (literally) millions of details, unfaltering communication
among all parties, and organization of this body of information in a
comprehensible fashion that allows for complete transparency. From the
agency’s perspective, failure to take each of these seriously will cause it to
be looked upon as the industry’s big brother, rather than the removed
regulator working to ensure public health and safety. From industry’s
perspective, failure to pursue all means to further these managerial
objectives opens the door to legal challenges and threatens substantial cost
consequences, which will lead to significant setbacks for nuclear
projects.224
Early indications suggest that all parties are taking this seriously.
Last July, work at the Vogtle site was suspended for two days after an
internal audit conducted by the contractors revealed a failure to properly
222.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that Southern Company
expects its Vogtle COL to be issued in 2011).
223.
See supra note 199 (stating the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, the basis for the
NRC’s very own existence, which may inform one of the agency’s regulatory purposes).
224.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the failure to manage in the case
of the Zimmer and Shoreham plants, which ultimately led to failed nuclear projects after
billions of dollars were spent).
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document background checks of site workers.225 A company official noted
that it was taking the “documentation and review process very seriously and
[would] continue to regularly audit its practices," noting that "[s]afetyrelated work [would] resume after procedural requirements [were] met
. . . .”226 The NRC appears to be taking great steps to improve public access
to information—in addition to its ADAMS web-based document room
containing hundreds of thousands of documents, the NRC headquarters
provides public access to millions of additional documents, and the agency
is taking steps to provide easy access in a user-friendly manner.227
With thorough documentation, communication characterized by
full disclosure, complete transparency, and effective management leading
every aspect of a project will come public trust in the regulators to do their
job, even if the public is not actively involved as an official party in a
proceeding.228 Take the issue that arose with the hypothetical ITAAC set
forth in Part III.A, supra. With full disclosure and easy access to
information, a member of the public can discover and make known that the
closed ITAAC (even if implemented and met), because of a material flaw in
its definitional phrase, does not in fact provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection of the public health and safety as required by the
regulations.229 Even though the regulations preclude intervention, if the
industry and the agency take these imperatives seriously, the interested
party is not without recourse. Part 52 mandates that information “shall be
complete and accurate in all respects”230 and requires that the applicant
225.
See Stephanie Toone, Work on 2 Vogtle Sites Halted: Incorrect Background
Checks Cause Abeyance, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 7, 2010, available at
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2010-07-07/work-2-vogtle-sites-halted (noting that
the fitness-for-duty exam given to site workers, which included questions dealing with issues
such as substance abuse, was conducted verbally and was thus insufficient, causing the
company to halt safety-related work for two days while they took corrective action).
226.
Id. (emphasis added).
227.
See, e.g., Better, Faster, Stronger: The NRC Streamlines Content Management,
CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS COUNCIL, http://www.cio.gov/pages.cfm/page/Better-Faster-StrongerThe-NRC-Streamlines-Content-Management (last visited Dec. 4, 2011) (“The new ADAMS
will provide a modern, flexible, and interoperable user experience that resonates with a
younger workforce.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and
the Environment).
228.
See, e.g., Harold P. Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing: The Great Delusion, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 522 (1974) (“The AEC
should be relied upon and trusted to ensure adequate safety in precisely the same manner as
is presently the case with the Federal Aviation Administration and the Food and Drug
Administration in their areas of responsibility.”). Note that this call to increase the public
trust in the (predecessor) agency was made while the last generation of plants was just
getting underway. Today, this goal is attainable given advances in information technology.
229.
See 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(3) (2010) (implying that a closed ITAAC will necessarily
demonstrate conformity with the ESP, the NRC’s rules and regulations, and the Atomic
Energy Act, which is not the case under this hypothetical).
230.
Id. § 52.8(a).
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notify the agency if information is identified “as having for the regulated
activity a significant implication for public health and safety or common
defense and security.”231 With sanctions available for “deliberate
misconduct” for violations of any rule or regulation,232 the party’s interests
are safeguarded even if not permitted to intervene, and in the worst-case
scenario, the party can take the information to the media. Fostering
confidence in the agency, furthered by transparency of what is happening
on the ground, will enable the regulations to overlay a solid foundation,
encouraging the nuclear revival to charge forward.
B. Flexibility without Compromising the Dictates of the New Licensing
Process and the URENCO Example
Southern Company’s combined license application references its
own early site permit and a standard design certification for the AP1000
reactor designed by Westinghouse.233 In March 2009, the ASLB considered
a petition to intervene and submit three contentions submitted by five joint
petitioners.234 One issue in the proceeding was that Westinghouse (who
actually designed the AP1000 and obtained standard design approval under
Subpart E of Part 52) was seeking to amend its certified standard design for
the AP1000.235 Petitioners argued that since that revision was still pending
(and the agency had recently received its sixteenth and seventeenth236
revisions to the amendment), “a meaningful technical and safety review of
the [combined license application could not] be conducted without the full
disclosure of the final and complete reactor design,”237 which was
incorporated by reference in the COL application. The ASLB rejected the
contentions for their “failure to proffer a specific, sufficiently supported
material issue regarding a safety concern associated with the interaction
between the pending AP1000 [revisions] and the Vogtle [COL
application].”238 While applying its characteristic strict interpretation of the
procedural requirements for admitting contentions, the ASLB’s order
231.
Id. § 52.8(b).
232.
See id. § 52.4(c) (prohibiting deliberate misconduct and referencing the
enforcement mechanisms for any violation).
233.
See S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. 139, 145 (2009) (noting that
Westinghouse designed the units Southern Company referenced in its standard design
certification).
234.
See id. at 145–46 (setting forth the procedural facts).
235.
See id. at 156 (noting that the previously approved standard design certification
was facing potential modification).
236.
The agency received the eighteenth revision to the amendment on December 1,
2010.
237.
S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. at 155 (quoting the two nearly identical
proposed contentions).
238.
Id.
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expressed concern about the petitioners “realistic opportunity” to submit a
future challenge after the AP1000 rulemaking, given the stringent
admissibility requirements and timing issues.239
When the need for amendment arises in the context of a single
application, complications arise; in the context of a combined license
incorporating other licenses by reference, the complexity increases
exponentially; and when implemented ITAAC are affected by these
changes, one starts to get the picture of how a proceeding may quickly
devolve into chaos while parties wrangle over how to proceed, perhaps over
a change as simple as utilizing dirt from one area on a 3,100-acre plot to
supplement the dirt that was specified in the application (from the same
3,100-acre plot).240
There is an undeniable need for flexibility within this new
regulatory scheme. How is this to be accomplished without forgetting the
lessons of the past? Interpreting section 103(b) liberally to allow the
interested party to request a hearing regarding the materially flawed ITAAC
might seem prudent on first glance241—until one recalls how proceedings
under the two step devolved into chaos when the ASLB essentially
interpreted the procedural rules away, allowing parties to intervene and
anchor a proceeding.242 Further, while amendment procedures may not be
necessary to address certain changes, given the incredible safety factors
implicated in a nuclear power generation facility, the issue cannot be taken
lightly.
Thus, the NRC should maintain its stringent procedural
requirements but look to other areas of nuclear licensing that have had
success to serve as a model for the new nuclear plant proceedings. First,
currently operating facilities can serve as a guide for how to deal with
change. While amendments are required for some changes to an operating
license, there are provisions that allow the licensee to make changes and
then report to the NRC after the fact.243 Adopting a comparable provision to
apply to new nuclear plants makes sense—while the Southeastern Pocket
Gopher might not have had its time to shine, resources might have been
dedicated to other more important areas had Southern Company had the
ability to go ahead and use the alternate dirt (and had they followed up with
notification to the agency).
239.
See id. at 158 (expressing concern regarding the petitioner’s future ability to
question the safety impacts of the revisions once approved, in light of the high threshold for
admissibility, and ultimately referring the issue to the Commission).
240.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the “dirt” issue at the Vogtle site).
241.
See supra Part III.A (describing the hypothetical to which this refers).
242.
See supra Part II.A (explaining the two-step process and the Houston Lighting and
Power proceeding to which this refers).
243.
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.59(c) (2011) (setting forth the criteria that, if met, will allow a
licensee to fix a problem or make a change without obtaining a license amendment).
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The URENCO Group’s success244 in obtaining a license to operate
a uranium enrichment facility under Part 70 of the regulations can serve as
a model for attaining such flexibility in the Part 52 context. URENCO
submitted its license application and environmental report under Part 70 in
December 2003, the agency granted the license in June 2006, and the
facility was inaugurated in June 2010.245 While the Part 70 scheme differs
significantly from the new nuclear licensing regulations, the URENCO
experience is instructive, particularly in light of how the judiciary handled a
challenge to the legality of the operating license. Individuals living near the
facility filed a petition for review of the NRC’s decision to grant
URENCO’s license in the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, claiming statutory violations.246 Petitioners alleged that “the NRC
violated the Atomic Energy Act by ‘supplementing’ the [environmental
impact statement] after the hearings on the license application,”247 along
with several other claims, all of which were rejected.248 In its decision, the
court found that the NRC had thoroughly considered the necessary
environmental issues and looked beyond the environmental impact
statement (“EIS”) to reach that conclusion: “In addition to the EIS
document, the Licensing Board and the NRC subsequently developed an
exhaustive record as they considered petitioners’ environmental contentions
and supplemented the EIS. . . . The agency plainly met its NEPA obligation
to take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of approving the
license.”249 This suggests courts might be willing to leave the agency some
room for flexibility with regard to applications and licenses under the
appropriate circumstances. If this is true, there may be some relief to the
agency seeking to alleviate the tension between requiring applicants to
provide massive amounts of information to ensure public health and safety

244.
See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Energy Inst., NEI Congratulates URENCO on
Inauguration of Uranium Enrichment Facility in N.M. (June 3, 2010), available at
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-congratulates-urenco-on-inaugurationof-uranium-enrichment-facility-in-nm/ (“This project is noteworthy for its status as a success
story in nuclear facility licensing, for its considerable economic impact in the region, for its
exemplary interactions with state and community leaders, and for its role in increasing
domestic sources of uranium enrichment services.”).
245.
See Louisiana Energy Services (LES) Gas Centrifuge Facility, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/lesfacility.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing the license application and environmental report as well as
other information about URENCO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
246.
See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory. Comm’n, 509 F.3d 562,
565 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the parties to the case and petitioners claims).
247.
Id. at 568.
248.
See id. at 571 (denying the petitions for review and upholding the NRC’s decision
to grant the license to produce enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear reactors).
249.
Id. at 569.
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and creating conditions that are not guaranteed to sink the agency under its
own administrative load.
V. Conclusion
The two-pronged approach set forth in Part IV, supra, equips the
NRC, together with industry, to conquer the legal and practical challenges
faced as this fleet of reactors cruises toward the construction phase. By
taking the steps necessary to ensure exemplary management on all fronts,
and by providing for flexibility within the regulatory framework without
compromising the agency’s hard line stance and other efficiency-enhancing
tactics, the new licensing scheme may be judged a success. First, this
approach will allow for better, and thus legally adequate, public
participation, even absent increasing public access to these proceedings. As
an ancillary but important matter, improving the flow of information and
taking steps to ensure transparency will also increase the public confidence
in the program generally. Second, in addition to eliminating the legal
barriers, this two-pronged approach may have the practical effect of
bringing about further streamlining of the licensing process, which will be
essential to avoiding the defects of the two-step process that these
regulations intended to cure.
The stakes are high for industry, the agency, and the American
public. The benefits of creating a stable licensing framework to support a
safe and thriving nuclear power industry are vast; realizing the ends the
ITAAC process set out to achieve and effectively managing the licensing
process in a dynamic world will make those benefits possible. Success will
increase the contribution of cheaper, cleaner, more reliable energy within
our energy portfolio, create tens or even hundreds of thousands of jobs,
provide environmental advantages other energy sources lack, move us
closer to energy independence, and bring immense economic benefits. In
addition to losing the benefits, the costs of failure will not only be reflected
on the income statements of Southern Company and its counterparts, but
also on the value of the agency and on the electricity bills of you and me.
With the combined license for Vogtle expected in the very near future and
other projects close behind, the new licensing regulations are in their
defining moment.

